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INTRODUCTION 
President Bush has made homeownership a central element of his hous­
ing policy.' Through the American Dream Down Payment Act,2 the 
Homeowner's Tax Credit, and the Zero Downpayment Mortgage Initiative, 
President Bush is attempting to make homeownership easier both by reduc­
ing the down payment required and by increasing financing options for the 
* J.D. May 2006. I would like to thank Professors Michael Barr and Nina Mendelson as 
well as the entire Volume 104 Notes Office for their willingness to read and comment on earlier 
versions of this Note. 
I. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Increasing Affordable Housing and Expand­
ing Homeownership (Sept. 2, 2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/ 
09/20040902-5.html [hereinafter Expanding Homeownership]. 
2. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12821 (West 2005). 
1993 
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purchase of a home.3 More Americans owned homes in 2004 than ever be­
fore.4 This increase in homeownership has allowed more families to enjoy 
the "security, dignity, and independence that comes with owning their piece 
of the American drearn."5 
Homeownership is particularly important because of the numerous bene­
fits it provides. It is one of the few vehicles through which low-income and 
minority families can accumulate capital.6 For this reason, it can provide a 
multigenerational path out of poverty.7 Not only do homeowners accumulate 
wealth that can be passed on to the next generation, homeownership increases 
psychological and physical well-being, self-esteem, and social capital.8 Chil­
dren of homeowners are not only more likely to own homes themselves, but 
are also more likely to graduate from high school and college, are less likely 
to become pregnant while teenagers, are more likely to have greater future 
earnings, and are more likely to be involved in civic affairs.9 
3. During the first six months of 2004, the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) devoted $161.5 million to helping low-income, first-time homebuyers with down payments. 
U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., FISCAL YEAR 2006 BUDGET SUMMARY 7 (Feb. 7, 2005), 
http://www.hud.gov/about/budget/fy06/fy06budget.pdf. 
4. U.S. Census Bureau, Housing Vacancy Survey-Historical Table 14, http:// 
www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/historic/histt14.html (last visited May 28, 2006); U.S. 
Census Bureau, Housing Vacancies and Homeownership-Annual 2004: table 20, http:// 
www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/annual04/ann04t20.html (last _visited May 9, 2006). 
5. Expanding Homeownership, supra note I. 
6. Julie Kosterlitz, Home Sweet Home?, 36 NAT'L J. 712 (Mar. 6, 2004) (" '(P]aying off the 
mortgage on a home has been, and will continue to be, the easiest way for [low-income and minor­
ity] households to build personal wealth."'(quoting Stephen Brobeck)); Bruce Katz et al., 
Rethinking Local Affordable Housing Strategies: Lessons from 70 Years of Policy and Practice (The 
Brookings Inst. & The Urban Inst., Discussion Paper, Dec. 2003) [hereinafter Brookings, Housing 
Policy] ("Housing wealth accounts for a vast majority of total assets for low-income and minority 
homeowners. "). For example, for homeowners with household incomes below $20,000, homeown­
ership accounts for seventy-two percent of net household wealth. For homeowners with incomes 
between $20,000 and $49,000, home equity constitutes fifty-five percent of total wealth. NICOLAS P. 
RETSINAS & ERIC s. BELSKY, Low-INCOME OWNERSHIP: EXAMINING THE UNEXAMINED GOAL 201 
(2002). Although some raise concerns that low-income households are more likely to be harmed by 
depreciations in home equity, e.g., Dean Baker, The Housing Bubble: A Ttme Bomb in Low-Income 
Communities?, NAT'L HOUSING INST., May-June 2004, http://www.nhi.org/online/issues/135/ 
bubble.html, the limited research available shows that low-price homes are more likely than expen­
sive homes to increase in value and less likely to decrease in value. RETSINAS & BELSKY, supra, at 
203-05. 
7. Kosterlitz, supra note 6, at 714 ("[S]ome people see tackling racial disparities in home­
ownership as the next front in the battle for racial equality. 'The racial wealth gap is the starkest 
lever of racial inequality and is transmitted from one generation to the next.' " (quoting Thomas M. 
Shapiro)). 
8. Brookings, Housing Policy, supra note 6, at 58-59. Although some of the studies attrib­
uting these benefits to homeownership are open to criticism on grounds that they may blur 
correlation and causation, low-income homeowners themselves attribute improvements in their lives 
to homeownership. William M. Rohe & Michael A. Stegman, The Effects of Homeownership on the 
Self-Esteem, Perceived Control and Life Satisfaction of Low-Income People, 60 J. AM. PLAN. Ass' N 
173, 180 (2004) (finding that eight-five percent of low-income homeowners said that "owning a 
home made them feel better " and that seventy-one percent said that homeownership gave them 
"increased control over their lives "). 
9. Brookings, Housing Policy, supra note 6, at 59; see also Kosterlitz, supra note 6. Al­
though homeownership in poor neighborhoods may produce fewer benefits, recent research shows 
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Through much of this nation's history, however, blacks have been sub­
ject to a host of discriminatory practices in the housing market. Realtors 
refused to show blacks homes in white neighborhoods. Lenders refused 
mortgages on the basis of race or the racial composition of neighborhoods. 
When blacks did succeed in buying homes, their investments often depreci­
ated because realtors used blockbusting to increase housing prices 
temporarily in neighborhoods transitioning from white to black.10 
In response to such discriminatory practices, Congress enacted the Fair 
Housing Act, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (FHA).'1 Congress 
recognized that widespread racial discrimination in the housing market was 
preventing integration and interfering with minority access to jobs and qual­
ity education.12 Spurred by the race riots in the late 1960s, Congress looked 
to the FHA to ease the tension resulting from racial isolation.13 Through the 
FHA, Congress hoped "to eliminate the discriminatory business practices 
which might prevent a person economically able to do so from purchasing a 
house regardless of his race."14 
Despite the many successes of the FHA, homeownership rates among 
blacks continue to lag behind those of whites; non-Hispanic whites are half 
again as likely as blacks to own their homes.15 The unavailability of home­
owners insurance in black neighborhoods contributes to the gap in 
homeownership rates.16 Lenders refuse to write mortgages on uninsured 
property for fear of risking a destruction of their collateral simultaneous 
with a reduction of the borrower's resources and capacity for repayment. 
Insurers have been reluctant to write policies in black neighborhoods.'7 
When insurance is available, blacks pay more per dollar of insurance than 
that homeownership in almost any neighborhood will benefit children. Brookings, Housing Policy, 
supra note 6, at 60. In fact, children of renters may be better off if their parents purchase homes in 
distressed neighborhoods than if they remain renters and move to better neighborhoods. Id. 
10. Blockbusting occurs when realtors sell homes to black families in a white neighborhood 
in such a way as to create a panic among the white residents. GEORGE R. METCALF, FAIR Hous1NG 
COMES OF AGE 88 (1988). White residents leave the neighborhood and blacks, who are willing to 
pay extra to live in an integrated neighborhood, purchase the homes for a premium. Id. The resulting 
turnover in homes benefits realtors by increasing prices and sales. Id. 
11. 114 CONG. REc. 2276, 2281 (1968). 
12. Id. at 2273. 
13. Charles L. Nier, ill, Perpetuation of Segregation: Toward a New Historical and Legal 
Interpretation of Redlining Under the Fair Housing Act, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 617, 628-30 
(1999). 
14. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351, 1359 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting Dunn 
v. Midwestern lndem. Mid-Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 472 F. Supp. 1106, 1109 ( S.D. Ohio 1979)). 
15. Oversight of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, Including the Depart­
ment's Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2005: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 108th 
Cong. (2004) (statement of Alphonso Jackson, Secretary, United States Department of Housing and 
Urban Development). 
16. See PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL ADVISORY PANEL ON INSURANCE IN RIOT-AFFECTED AREAS, 
MEETING THE INSURANCE CRISIS OF OUR CITIES (1968) [hereinafter ADVISORY PANEL]; see also 
Cisneros, 52 F.3d at 1360 ("[T]he availability of property insurance has a direct and immediate 
affect on a person's ability to obtain housing."). 
17. NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 297 (7th Cir. 1992). 
1 996 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 104:1993 
do whites, even when controlling for income.18 The available data indicate 
that these premiums exceed those necessary to cover higher losses in black 
neighborhoods.19 
Insurers use a wide range of practices which contribute to the pricing 
differential in insurance for whites and blacks. For example, insurance com­
panies typically establish a maximum age for houses beyond which policies 
become more expensive or entirely unavailable.20 Since a disproportionate 
number of blacks live in older homes,21 this results in making insurance un­
available or more expensive for this population. 
Similarly, insurance companies consider the market value of a home in 
deciding whether to underwrite it and in deciding what type of policy to 
provide at what rate.22 For example, insurers often establish a minimum­
value threshold below which insurance is unavailable.23 Because low-income 
minorities need to buy inexpensive homes, and since insurance is necessary 
to secure a loan, minimum-value requirements operate to prevent poor peo­
ple from buying homes. Insurers who do offer to cover inexpensive homes 
usually charge higher rates and refuse to write insurance for the entire re-
24 placement cost of the home. 
Insurance companies also adjust premiums by neighborhood in a way 
that increases prices in low-income, minority areas. Although insurance 
companies no longer draw red lines around minority neighborhoods to mark 
off areas where they will not underwrite policies,25 they accomplish similar 
results by cleaving territory based in part on crime rates, the percentage of 
owner-occupied homes in the neighborhood, the number of vacant buildings 
in the neighborhood, and the response time of the fire and police depart­
ments.26 Insurance companies fail to market insurance in low-income, 
minority areas27 and charge higher rates per dollar of insurance.28 As a result, 
18. See infra notes 199-203 and accompanying text. 
19. Id. 
20. Robert R. Detlefsen, Risk-Based Homeowners Insurance under Siege: The Slippery 
Slope from Redlining Charges to Disparate Impact Claims 11 (Nov. 1997), available at 
http://www.cei.org/pdf/1509.pdf. 
21. Gregory D. Squires, Race, Politics, and the Law: Recurring Themes in the Insurance 
Redlining Debate, in INSURANCE REDLINING: DISINVESTMENT, REINVESTMENT, AND THE EVOLVING 
ROLE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 1, 11 (Gregory D. Squires ed., 1997). 
22. This information comes from informal conversations with agents at State Farm, Ameri-
can Family, Allstate, and Farmers Insurance companies. 
23. Detlefsen, supra note 20, at 13. 
24. Id. 
25. This practice is known as "redlining." See, e.g., NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 
978 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1992). 
26. Detlefsen, supra note 20, at 11-14. 
27. See, e.g., L. H. Otis, Availability Woes Documented in Pa., 101 NAT'L UNDERWRITER: 
PROP. & CASUALTY/RISK & BENEFITS MGMT., Sept. 15, 1997, at 3. 
28. L. H. Otis, New Evidence of Urban Insurance Gap Released, 99 NAT'L UNDERWRITER: 
PROP. & CASUALTY/RISK & BENEFITS MGMT., June 26, 1995, at 3 [hereinafter Otis, Urban Gap]. 
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insurance companies typically have lower loss-to-premium ratios in minor­
ity neighborhoods than in others.29 
Finally, insurance companies use subjective criteria, such as requiring 
that the insured " 'be a Eerson of integrity and financial stability who takes 
pride in his property.' " This language has been likened to "code words" 
used to exclude black customers in the era of overt redlining.31 Subjective 
criteria provide a vehicle for insurance agents to exercise their own biases. 
This Note argues that because homeowners insurance is central to 
homeownership, the FHA applies to insurance underwriting policies, such 
as those mentioned above, that have a disparate impact on minority potential 
homeowners. Part I considers whether the FHA applies to homeowners in­
surance and concludes that homeowners insurance is covered by the Act. 
Part II goes on to argue that the FHA applies to homeowners insurance even 
where the discrimination results from disparate impact, rather than from 
disparate treatment. Finally, Part III analyzes the above-mentioned policies 
of the insurance industry under the FHA disparate impact standard. 
I. APPLICATION OF THE FHA TO INSURANCE 
Although courts have disagreed about whether the FHA applies to 
homeowners insurance, the great weight of authority supports its applica­
tion. 32 Section I.A analyzes the language of the FHA and concludes that it 
applies to insurance. Section l.B examines the legislative history and deter­
mines that applying the Act to insurance comports with congressional intent. 
Section LC presents the alternative argument that, even if the FHA does not 
expressly apply to insurance, courts should give deference to the Depart­
ment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regulation forbidding 
discrimination in insurance under the FHA. Finally, Section l.D determines 
that application of the FHA to insurance is consistent with state control of 
the insurance industry. 
29. See infra notes 199-203 and accompanying text. Recently, some insurance companies 
have replaced consideration of these factors with consideration of past loss rates from the neighbor­
hood. Supra note 22. To the extent that the above factors are predictive of risk, using loss rates by 
neighborhood will continue to result in insurance costing more in poor, urban areas, but may mini­
mize differences in loss ratios. 
30. Squires, supra note 21, at 6 (quoting a 1993 Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company 
underwriting manual). 
31. Id. 
32. Compare Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351 (6th Cir. 1995), NAACP v. 
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1992), Nat'I Fair Hous. Alliance, Inc. v. Prudential 
Ins. Co. of Am., 208 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2002), Toledo Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 
94 Ohio Misc. 2d 151 (Ohio C.P. 1997), and Dunn v. Midwestern lndem. Mid-Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 
472 F. Supp. 1106 (S.D. Ohio 1979), with Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 
1984). 
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A. Statutory Interpretation 
The language of the FHA should be interpreted to include homeowners 
insurance. Although insurance is not explicitly mentioned in the Act, the 
broad language of both § 3604 and § 3605 logically covers insurance. 
Under§ 3604(a), it is unlawful to do anything that makes a dwelling "un­
available."33 Because insurance is required in order to qualify for a mortgage, 
and since most people need a mortgage in order to buy a home, discrimination 
in underwriting decisions or in insurance pricing can make a dwelling un­
available, in contravention of§ 3604.34 
Although it could be argued that "otherwise make unavailable or deny"35 
should only apply to activities similar to the refusal to sell or rent a home, not 
to all activities that make housing unavailable, this reading is inconsistent with 
other § 3604 jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has found that the FHA 
should be read broadly.36 Courts have readily applied § 3604 to a number of 
activities beyond the actual sale or rental transaction, such as zoning,37 the 
construction of low-income housing,38 and the provision of Section 8 housing 
vouchers. 39 
Most courts have agreed that insurance, like zoning, is covered by § 3604. 
The Sixth Circuit explicitly rejected the argument that, under the canon of 
ejusdem generis, the FHA must be interpreted to exclude insurance.40 That 
court found a "direct connection of availability of property insurance and abil­
ity to purchase a house," which makes insurance discrimination the kind of 
discrimination banned by the FHA.41 The Seventh Circuit agreed that banning 
33. Section 3604 states, in relevant part: 
it shall be unlawful-
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the 
sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, 
color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin. 
(b) To discriminate against any person in the tenns, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a 
dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, 
color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin. 
42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2000) (emphasis added). 
34. As Judge Easterbrook put it, "no insurance, no loan; no Joan, no house." Am Family, 978 
F.2d at 297. 
35. 42 u.s.c. § 3604 (2000). 
36. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972); see also Michigan Prot & 
Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337, 344 (6th Cir. 1994) ("Congress intended§ 3604 to reach a 
broad range of activities that have the effect of denying housing opportunities to a member of a pro­
tected class."). 
37. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977). 
38. Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1982). 
39. Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49 (I st Cir. 2000). 
40. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351, 1357-58 (6th Cir. 1995). 
41. Id. at 1359 (deferring to HUD's interpretation of the FHA as applying to insurance as 
promulgated in 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(d)(4) (2005)) (citing Dunn v. Midwestern Indem. Mid-Am. Fire & 
Cas. Co., 472 F. Supp. 1106, 1109 (S.D. Ohio 1979)). 
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insurance discrimination forwards the FHA's goal of "removing obstacles to 
minorities' ownership of housing."42 Only the Fourth Circuit has disputed that 
this language applies to homeowners insurance.43 Various district courts have 
also held that this language applies to insurance, both in the context of race­
based insurance redlining44 and in the context of underwriting hazard and li­
ability insurance for mental health group homes.45 
Although most courts have analyzed insurance under § 3604, insurance 
also falls within the language of§ 3605. Section 3605 makes it unlawful to 
discriminate in lending or in "providing other financial assistance."46 Since 
insurance is a prerequisite for obtaining a loan, the ban on discrimination in 
lending is meaningless if insurance discrimination is left unchecked. Thus, 
insurance is an integral part of the "residential real estate-related transactions" 
covered by § 3605 and logically falls within the scope of "financial assis­
tance" mentioned in that section.47 
The fact that insurance discrimination is a financial service within the 
scope of§ 3605, however, does not mean that it is not also within the scope of 
§ 3604.48 Statutory provisions commonly overlap,49 and, as explained above, 
insurance discrimination does function to "make unavailable or deny" hous­
ing within the scope of § 3604. Courts have analyzed other financial 
42. NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 298 (7th Cir. 1992). 
43. Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 419, 423-24 (4th Cir. 1984). 
44. Dunn, 472 F. Supp. at 1109. 
45. See Wai v. Allstate Ins. Co., 75 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 1999) (applying the FHA to property 
insurance for group homes for the mentally retarded); Nevels v. W. World Ins. Co., 359 F. Supp. 2d 
1110, 1117-22 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (extending the reasoning in earlier cases to apply the FHA to an 
insurer's refusal to provide liability insurance for group homes for the mentally disabled). 
46. Section 3605 states, in relevant part: 
(a) In general 
It shall be unlawful for any person or other entity whose business includes engaging in residential 
real estate-related transactions to discriminate against any person in making available such a 
transaction, or in the terms or conditions of such a transaction, because of race, color, religion, 
sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin. 
(b) "Residential real estate-related transaction" defined 
As used in this section, the term "residential real estate-related transaction" means any of the fol­
lowing: 
(1) The making or purchasing of loans or providing other financial assistance-
( A) for purchasing, constructing, improving, repairing, or maintaining a dwelling . . .  
42 U.S.C. § 3605 (2000) (emphasis added). 
47. Id. This conclusion was reached by the court in National Fair Housing Alliance, Inc. v. 
Prudential Insurance Company of America, 208 F. Supp. 2d 46, 58 (D.D.C. 2002). 
48. Insurers have argued that because § 3605 covers specific financial services, the phrases 
"otherwise make unavailable " and "discriminate . . .  in the provision of services " in § 3604 cannot be 
interpreted to refer to financial services. Mackey, 724 F.2d at 423. Because insurance is a financial 
service, and not explicitly mentioned in § 3605, it must be beyond the Act entirely. Id. The Fourth 
Circuit adopted this view in Mackey. Id. 
49. NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 298 (7th Cir. 1992). 
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services arguably covered under § 3605, such as Section 8 housing vouch­
ers, under§ 3604.50 
B. Legislative History and Purpose of the FHA 
The legislative history of the FHA demonstrates that applying the Act to 
insurance promotes Congress's policy goals. The purpose of the FHA, as 
expressed in the legislative history, is to prevent all discrimination relating 
to housing. The link between insurance and the purchase of a home puts 
insurance discrimination squarely within that purpose. 
Through the FHA, Congress intended to make a broad statement against 
discrimination while "leaving details to the future."51 Congress made no at­
tempt to specify all the services that would be covered by the Act. For 
example, the "Questions and Answers" document, used in the Senate, ex­
plains that the "Act will cover brokers, property owners, managers and 
anyone else who participates in the sale, rental or financing of housing."52 
Similarly, as a result of negotiations in the Senate, the language of § 3605 in 
the final Act was broadened, making it unlawful not only to "deny a loan"53 
but also to deny "other financial assistance."54 In introducing the Bill, one 
sponsor explained that it would "eliminate the discriminatory business prac­
tices" that affect homeownership.55 He did not mention any limits on the 
types of businesses affected.56 
It is not surprising that insurance is not discussed in the FHA or its legis­
lative history. The Fourth Circuit in Mackey v. Nationwide Insurance Co. 57 
reached the contrary conclusion that, because the insurance industry needs 
to be free to make decisions based on risk, Congress would have explicitly 
considered the needs of the insurance industry if it had intended the FHA to 
apply to insurance.58 The debates on the FHA, however, focused on the so­
cial problems created by housing discrimination, not on the policies through 
which such discrimination manifests.59 In introducing the Bill, its sponsors 
spoke extensively about the abysmal conditions in the "rotting cores of cen­
tral cities,"60 such as inferior schools61 and the unavailability of jobs,62 but 
50. Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49 (I st.Cir. 2000). 
51. Am. Family, 978 F.2d at 299. 
52. 114 CONG. REc. 2272 (1968) (emphasis added). 
53. Id. at 2270. 
54. Id. at 4572. 
55. Id. at 2275. 
56. Id. 
57. 724 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1984). 
58. Id. at 423. 
59. NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 299 (7th Cir. 1992). 
60. 114 CONG. REC. 2274 (1968). 
61. Id. at 2273. 
62. See, e. g. , id. at 2282. 
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did not discuss specific housing practices that contributed to the problems.6 3  
The only specific practice mentioned a t  all was blockbusting, which is ex­
pressly prohibited by the Act.64 Throughout the debates, the Senate focused 
on housing quality6 5  and overcrowding66  in inner-city, minority areas. Sena­
tors also argued that the Act could address concerns regarding the high price 
of housing in low-income, minority areas6 7  as well as racial differentials in 
homeownership rates.6 8  Insurance discrimination contributes to high costs 
and urban underinvestment,6 9  making it the type of discrimination that Con­
gress was attempting to address through the FHA. 
It could be argued that, in passing the FHA, Congress intended to rem­
edy inner-city conditions only by making it possible for minorities to exit 
these areas, not by making financing available to those who remain in the 
inner city. Congress was very concerned with protecting minorities' rights to 
move to white neighborhoods.7 0  However, the supporters of the Act referred 
repeatedly to "choice" in housing.71 This must include the choice to invest in 
a home in the inner city, in addition to the choice to leave. 7 2  
That some members of Congress tried unsuccessfully to pass an 
amendment to the FHA to include insurance explicitly does not indicate that 
Congress did not intend the FHA to apply to insurance.7 3  The amendment 
was introduced by one of the original sponsors of the FHA, seeking to clar­
ify the meaning of the bill in response to the Mackey decision.7 4  Its sponsor 
63. See id. at 227�1. 
64. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (2000). 
65. See, e.g., 114 CONG. REc. 2526 (1968) (speaking of the goal of "a decent home . . .  for 
every American family "); id. at 2528 ("[H]ousing of nonwhite families is consistently of poorer 
quality than that of white households of the same income level . . .  In 1960, [forty-four] percent of 
all nonwhites lived in substandard housing as compared to [thirteen] percent of white families. "). 
66. See, e.g., id. at 2530, 2281. 
67. Id. at 2528 ("[N]onwhites-whatever their income-pay higher prices for lower quality 
housing than white families. "); id. at 2540 ("[T]here is a growing number of Negro Americans who 
are able to buy good housing, but who find that so much of their purchasing power is absorbed by 
exorbitant real estate costs in the ghetto . . . .  "). 
68. Id. at 2529 (noting that rates of homeownership remain lower for nonwhites than for 
whites at every income level). 
69. ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 16. 
70. See, e.g., 114 CONG. REc. 2274 (1968) ("[H]ousing discrimination . . .  tell[s] the Negro 
citizen trapped in an urban slum there is no escape, that even were he able to get a decent education 
and a good job, he would still not have the freedom other Americans enjoy to choose where he and 
his family will live. "). 
71. See, e.g., id. at 2283, 2524, 2998; Fair Housing Act of 1967: Hearing before the S. 
Comm. on Commerce and Finance, 90th Cong. 6 (1967) (statement of Ramsey Clark, Att'y Gen. of 
the United States). 
72. This was recognized by the Second Circuit in banning racial quotas designed to maintain 
integrated communities by preventing white flight. United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 
1096, 1100 (2d Cir. 1988) ("Section 3604 'is designed to ensure that no one is denied the right to 
live where they choose for discriminatory reasons. '" (quoting Southend Neighborhood Improve­
ment Ass'n v. County of St. Clair, 743 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir. 1984))). 
73. NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 299 (7th Cir. 1992). 
74. 132 CONG. REC. 848 (1986). 
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emphasized that the Act had always been intended to apply to all "links" in 
the "real estate chain," including homeowners insurance.75 The amendment 
was discussed only briefly in the Senate and never came up for a floor 
vote. 76 The failure of legislation under these circumstances is likely unre­
lated to its merits. 
77 The Seventh Circuit considered this question and agreed 
that the failure of this amendment should not be considered determinative of 
C . l .  1s ongress1ona mtent. 
That Congress passed the Urban Property Insurance Protection and Re­
insurance Act (UPIPRA) of 1968 the same year it enacted the FHA similarly 
does not imply that the FHA should not be interpreted to apply to insur­
ance.79 Although the passage of insurance-related legislation the same year 
as the FHA might support an inference that Congress intended to handle 
insurance problems outside of the FHA, UPIPRA does not address the same 
issues as the FHA. The purpose of UPIPRA was to provide a subsidy to in­
surers in order to "protect private insurance companies from the risk of 
catastrophic losses which resulted from riots or civil disorders."80 UPIPRA 
did not address discrimination, the central goal of the FHA.81 Thus, the first 
court to consider the question determined that insurance redlining is the 
"especial province of the Fair Housing Act."82 
C. Deference to HUD 's Interpretation 
Even if a court does not agree that the FHA clearly applies to insurance 
discrimination, courts should defer to HUD's interpretation, as expressed in 
24 C.F.R. § 100.70(d)(4).83 Under Chevron U.S.A.,  Inc. v. National Re­
sources Defense Council, Inc. , 84 courts defer to agency interpretations of 
their enabling statutes where (1) Congress has not "directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue" and (2) the "agency's answer is based on a per­
missible construction of the statute."85 
75. Id. 
76. See id. 
77. See, e. g., Order of R. R. Conductors v. Swan, 329 U.S. 520, 528 (1947). This is particu­
larly true where the failed legislation reflects an attempt to clarify an agency's jurisdiction. See, e. g., 
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 182-83 (Breyer, J., dissenting); United 
States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 170 (1968). 
78. Am. Family, 978 F.2d at 300. 
79. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351, 1358 (6th Cir. 1995). 
80. Id. at 1358 (quoting Dunn v. Midwestern Indem. Mid-Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 472 F. Supp. 
1106, 1111 (S.D. Ohio 1979)). 
81. Id. 
82. Dunn, 472 F. Supp. at 1112. 
83. The HUD regulation makes it illegal to "[r]efus[e] to provide . . .  property or hazard 
insurance for dwellings or providing such . . .  insurance differently because of race, color, religion, 
sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin. " 24 C.F. R. § 100.70(d)(4) (2005). 
84. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
85. Id. at 842-43. Although later decisions have somewhat limited the reach of the Chevron 
doctrine, they have not affected the application of the Chevron doctrine to rules, such as the HUD 
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Application of the FHA to insurance clearly survives the first prong of 
the Chevron test. According to the Chevron Court, the traditional tools of 
statutory construction should be used to determine whether Congress has 
directly spoken to the question.s6 As explained in Sections l.A-B, Congress 
has not directly spoken to the applicability of the FHA to homeowners in-
s1 surance. 
Under the second prong of the Chevron test, courts should defer to HUD's 
reasonable interpretation of the statute as applying to insurance.ss HUD's in­
terpretation is reasonable, as required under the second step of Chevron, 
because it is a possible interpretation of the language and forwards the pur­
pose of the Act.s9 The Sixth Circuit explicitly considered this question and 
concluded that HUD's interpretation is reasonable "in light of the direct con­
nection of availability of property insurance and ability to purchase a house" 
and given the broad purpose of the FHA.90 The Seventh Circuit agreed that the 
application of the FHA to insurance forwards the goals of the Act and found 
that "[n]othing in the text of the statute permits us to reject these proposed 
readings."91 The Fourth Circuit's ruling that the FHA does not apply to insur­
ance was issued prior to the promulgation of 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(d)(4) and 
prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron. 92 
The consistency of HUD's position on the application of the FHA to in­
surance discrimination further indicates that deference is appropriate.93 On the 
basis of its expertise, HUD has consistently interpreted the FHA to cover in­
surance since the 1970's.94 HUD promulgated a regulation explicitly 
regulation at issue here, that were promulgated through notice and comment rulemaking procedures. 
See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001) (denying Chevron deference to informal 
agency adjudication but preserving deference for notice and comment rules); Christensen v. Harris 
County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (denying Chevron deference to interpretive rules); Bowen v. 
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988) (denying Chevron deference to agency interpreta­
tions in legal briefs). 
86. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. 
87. If anything, Congress has indicated that the FHA does ban discrimination in homeowners 
insurance. See supra Sections l.A-B. 
88. NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 298 (7th Cir. 1992). 
89. See Barnart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003) (relying primarily on the text of the Act 
to determine if the agency interpretation was reasonable); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. 
for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 704--05 (1995) (relying on the legislative history and purpose of the 
statute, in addition to the text, to uphold the agency interpretation under of the Act); see also supra 
Sections 1.A-B (arguing that the language and purpose of the Act indicate that it should be read to 
apply to insurance). 
90. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351, 1359 (citing Dunn v. Midwestern 
lndem. Mid-Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 472 F. Supp. 1106, 1109 (S.D. Ohio 1979)). 
91. Am. Family, 978 F.2d at 298. 
92. See generally Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 724 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1984). 
93. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235 (considering consistency of the 
agency position as one factor indicative of the amount of weight that should be given to an agency 
interpretation). 
94. Am. Family, 978 F.2d at 299-300. 
2004 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 104:1993 
forbidding insurance discrimination under the FHA in 1989, less than a year 
after receiving rulemaking authority.95 
HUD's expertise lends further credibility to its consistent determination 
that insurance discrimination can make housing unavailable. HUD has sig­
nificant expertise in the issue of housing discrimination.96 Courts have 
recognized HUD's expertise when deferring to the agency's interpretations 
and decisions in other contexts.97 These cases give HUD considerable dis­
cretion to implement the varied and often competing goals of the national 
housing policy.98 Congress has also indicated its trust in HUD's expertise by 
delegating responsibility for interpretation of the FHA to HUD through its 
use of such broad language in the Act99 and by amending the FHA to give 
HUD rulemaking authority and increased enforcement powers.100 Given the 
consistency of HUD's position, the highly complex regulatory scheme of the 
FHA, the broad powers the Act confers on the agency, and the tremendous 
complexity of issues of residential segregation,101 HUD's determination that 
the FHA applies to insurance should carry great weight. 102 
95. This regulation makes it illegal to "(r]efus[e] to provide . . .  property or hazard insurance 
for dwellings or providing such . . .  insurance differently because of race, color, religion, sex, handi­
cap, familial status, or national origin." 24 C.F.R. § I00.70(d)(4) (2005). The regulation was 
promulgated on January 23, 1989. Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 
54 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3232 (Jan. 23, 1989). 
96. HUD is a well-established agency that has existed since 1965 and administers dozens of 
housing-related programs. HUD's History, http://www.hud.gov/library/bookshelfl 8/hudhistory.cfm 
(last visited Mar. 30, 2005). For a list of programs, see HUD Programs, http://www.hud.gov/ 
funds/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 30, 2005). For a discussion of the relevance of these factors in 
weighing the Agency's interpretation, see Mead, 533 U.S. at 234 (noting that agencies deserve addi­
tional deference where "'specialized experience and broader investigations and information' [are] 
available to the agency" (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944))); Aluminum 
Co. of Am. v. Cent. Lincoln Peoples' Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 387 (1984). 
97. Alschuler v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 686 F.2d 472, 481-87 (7th Cir. 1982) (defer­
ring to HUD informal adjudication regarding the location of housing under the Section 8 program); 
Capitol Mortgage Bankers, Inc. v. Cuomo, 222 F.3d 151 (4th Cir. 2000) (deferring to HUD's inter­
pretation of its authority in the area of mortgage lending). 
98. See, e.g., Alschuler, 686 F.2d at 481-487. 
99. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227 ("When Congress has 'explicitly left a gap for an agency to fill, 
there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the stat­
ute by regulation,' and any ensuing regulation is binding in the courts unless procedurally defective, 
arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute." (quoting Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc. v. Nat'! Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984))). Congress intended to delegate 
this type of broad authority to HUD. One Senator criticized the FHA during the floor debate be­
cause it "empower[ed] the Secretary of HUD to do virtually everything." 114 CONG. REc. 2538 
(1968). 
100. Fair Housing Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610-3612, 3614 (2005); Mead, 533 U.S. 
at 226--27 (holding that an administrative interpretation qualifies for Chevron deference when "Con­
gress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law," which can 
be demonstrated by a grant of the "power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rule­
making," and the agency's interpretation is an exercise of that power). 
101. See, e.g., STEPHEN GRANT MEYER, As LoNG As THEY DON'T MOVE NEXT DooR: SEG­
REGATION AND RACIAL CONFLICT IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 11 (2000). 
102. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 235 (considering these factors as indicative of the amount of 
weight that should be given to an agency interpretation). 
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D. Impact of the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
on the Interpretation of the FHA 
2005 
Insurance companies turn to the McCarran-Ferguson Act to argue that 
the FHA cannot be interpreted to apply to insurance.103 The McCarran­
Ferguson Act provides that federal law does not preempt state insurance law 
unless the federal law "specifically relates" to insurance. 104 Federal law not 
specifically relating to insurance should not be interpreted to "invalidate, 
impair, or supersede" state insurance law.105 Some argue that, under McCar­
ran-Ferguson, the FHA cannot be applied to insurance because it does not 
explicitly mention insurance and would preempt States' determinations of 
appropriate insurance discrimination regulations.106 
The McCarran-Ferguson Act was enacted to handle conflicts between 
state insurance regulations and federal antitrust laws, 107 and it should not be 
interpreted as invalidating subsequent civil rights laws. The Act was passed 
in 1945, in response to the Supreme Court's determination that insurance 
could be regulated under the Commerce Clause.108 Congress wanted to "pre­
serve the traditional role of the states in the taxation and regulation of the 
business of insurance" and to exempt insurance companies from antitrust 
laws.109 Congress did not intend to exempt insurance companies from civil 
rights legislation.110 The Act's reference to the "business" of insurance and, 
103. This argument has been raised in every major insurance discrimination case. See, e.g., 
Dehoyos v. Allstate Corp., 345 F.3d 290, 293 (5th Cir. 2003); NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 
978 F.2d 287, 293-94 (7th Cir. 1992). 
104. The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides: 
(a) State regulation. The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be sub­
ject to the Jaws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business. 
(b) Federal regulation. No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or super­
sede any Jaw enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or 
which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the busi­
ness of insurance . . . .  
1 5  U.S.C.A. § 1012 (West 2005). 
105. Id. § 1012(b). 
106. Almost every state has laws or regulations limiting discrimination in insurance. However, 
most of these regulations are much narrower than the FHA. Rosemary Baptiste et al., Redlining, 
Property Insurance and Urban Markets: Concepts, Issues, Initiatives, and Solutions, 49 Soc'y 
CHARTERED PROP. & CASUALTY UNDERWRITERS 82, 96-102 (1996). State laws typically prohibit 
"unfair discrimination between individuals of the same class or between neighborhoods within a 
municipality and of essentially the same hazard. " See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § J 0-3-1104(1)(1)(11) 
(2004). Since insurance companies argue that wealthier, white neighborhoods do not represent the 
same level of hazard as poor, minority neighborhoods, these laws do not reach most discrimination 
in homeowners insurance. 
107. Am. Family, 978 F.2d at 294. 
108. United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). 
109. Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 419, 420 (4th Cir. 1984). 
l JO. Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 691 F.2d 1054, 1065 (2d Cir. 1982), vacated on 
other grounds, 463 U.S. 1223 (1983). 
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specifically, to "fee[s] or tax[es]"111 demonstrates the Congressional focus 
on financial, not social, regulation of insurance companies. 
Even if the McCarran-Ferguson Act is applied to civil rights legislation, 
federal law does not "invalidate, impair, or supersede" state law unless it 
explicitly conflicts with an express provision of state law.112 Every circuit 
court that has considered this issue has held that federal anti-discrimination 
laws do not conflict with state insurance laws.113 These cases typically re­
quire that the insurance company "point to" a particular law that would be 
invalidated, impaired, or superseded.114 The existence of a "general regula­
tory scheme" does not preclude the application of a federal anti­
discrimination law, even where the federal law provides additional reme­
dies.115 That the application of the FHA could affect insurance prices and 
interfere with states' control over prices does not mean that the state law is 
invalidated. 116 Therefore, unless a particular state law allows insurers to dis­
criminate contrary to the FHA, the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not apply. 
II. APPLICATION OF THE FHA DISPARATE 
IMPACT STANDARD TO INSURANCE 
In addition to banning disparate treatment in the insurance business, the 
FHA should also be interpreted to forbid insurance policies with a disparate 
impact that are not justified by business necessity. Section II.A defines the 
disparate impact test used in FHA litigation not relating to insurance. Sec­
tion 11.B considers the applicability of that test to insurance. Section 11.C 
argues that, as part of the showing of business necessity, the insurer should 
bear the burden of showing the lack of a less discriminatory alternative. 
A. Disparate Impact under the FHA 
While no appellate court has considered the application of the FHA to 
disparate impact insurance claims, the FHA does apply to disparate impact 
claims in contexts other than insurance. Eleven circuit courts have consid­
ered this question, and all agreed that disparate impact claims are viable 
111. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1012 (West 2005). 
112. See, e.g., Dehoyos v. Allstate Corp., 345 F.3d 290, 295-97 (5th Cir. 2003). 
113. Id. at 299; Moore v. Liberty Nat'I Life Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 1209, 1221-22 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(considering preemption of§ 1981 and § 1982); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 
1351, 1363 (6th Cir. 1995); Merchants Home Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 50 F.3d 
1486, 1491-92 (9th Cir. 1995) (considering preemption of RICO); NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. 
Co., 978 F.2d 287, 297 (7th Cir. 1992); Mackey, 724 F.2d at 421. 
114. Dehoyos, 345 F.3d at 297. 
115. Mackey, 724 F.2d at 421. 
116. Dehoyos, 345 F.3d at 297 n.5. But see McClain v. Shelter Gen. Ins. Co., No. 97-1139-
CV-W-FJG, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34662, at *19-20 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2005) (holding that the 
court should not issue an order that would alter insurance rates approved by the state commission, in 
part because the commissioner considered discrimination in approving rates). 
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under the ·FHA.111 Although the D.C. Circuit has not ruled on this point, it 
has indicated its agreement with the other circuits, 118 and D .C. District Court 
judges have held that the FHA applies to disparate impact.119 The Supreme 
Court has construed similar language in Title VII to apply to disparate im­
pact.120 The Court also remanded Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corp. 121 for consideration of FHA claims after finding that 
there was no discriminatory intent. 122 
Although there is some confusion regarding the appropriate test to apply 
to disparate impact cases under the FHA, 123 a test derived from Title VII ju­
risprudence is appropriate in the FHA context. Under this test, in order to 
show a prima facie case of disparate impact, the plaintiff must ( 1) show that 
a disparate impact exists, (2) identify a policy alleged to have caused the 
disparate impact, and (3) show that the policy caused the disparate impact.124 
If the plaintiff succeeds in making a prima facie case, the burden shifts to 
the defendant to show that the policy is justified by a business necessity.125 
117. See, e.g., Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546, 1555 (5th Cir. 1996); Mountain 
Side Mobile Estates P'ship v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 56 F.3d 1243, 1250-51 (10th Cir. 
1995); Jackson v. Okaloosa County, 21 F.3d 1531, 1543 (11th Cir. 1994); Casa Marie, Inc. v. Supe­
rior Court of Puerto Rico, 988 F.2d 252, 269 n.20 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Starrett City 
Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1100 (2d Cir. 1988); Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 482-84 (9th Cir. 1988); 
Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 1986); Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 
1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d 789, 791-92 (5th Cir. 1978); Resi­
dent Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 147-48 (3d Cir. 1977); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. 
of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 
F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 1974). 
118. Miller v. Poretsky, 595 F.2d 780, 790 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
119. See, e.g., Nat') Fair Hous. Alliance, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 208 F. Supp. 2d 
46, 58-59 (D.D.C. 2002). 
120. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (construing the phrase "because of 
race, " which also appears in the FHA). 
121. 429 U.S. 252, 271 (1977). 
122. The Supreme Court has continued to leave open the question of disparate impact under 
the FHA after a number of courts ruled in favor of a disparate impact test. City of Cuyahoga Falls, 
Ohio v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188, 199-200 (2003) (ordering that disparate impact 
claims should be dismissed because plaintiffs "abandoned " them without commenting on the appli­
cability of disparate impact theories to the FHA); Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch, 
NAACP, 488 U.S. 15, 18 (1988) ("Since appellants conceded the applicability of the disparate­
impact test for evaluating the zoning ordinance under Title VIII, we do not reach the question 
whether that test is the appropriate one. Without endorsing the precise analysis of the Court of Ap­
peals, we are satisfied on this record that disparate impact was shown . . . .  "). 
123. See, e.g., Peter E. Mahoney, The End(s) of Disparate Impact: Doctrinal Reconstruction, 
Fair Housing and Lending law, and the Antidiscrimination Principle, 47 EMORY L.J. 409, 411 
(1998) (describing the standard as "sketchy and haphazard "). 
124. See, e.g., Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 148-49 (3d Cir. 1977). 
125. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)( l )(A) (2000). Several FHA cases were decided between the 
Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), and the rein­
statement of the "business necessity " test by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. These cases 
apply the more lenient "business justification " test of Wards Cove. However, these cases should not 
be given weight, as courts deciding FHA claims after 1991 have agreed that the "business necessity " 
test applies. John F. Stanton, The Fair Housing Act and Insurance: An Update and the Question of 
Disability Discrimination, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 141, 186-87 (2002). 
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Even if the practice is justified by business necessity, the defendant is still 
liable if a less discriminatory alternative exists. 
There is substantial support for this type of test among the courts. Sev­
eral circuits have used this precise test. 126 Courts that have adopted the 
alternative formulation agree that the primary considerations are (1)  the ex­
istence of a discriminatory effect that is (2) not justified by a legitimate 
business necessity. 127 As such, all circuits that have analyzed disparate im­
pact under the FHA agree with the basic precepts of the test.128 
The position of the Seventh Circuit further indicates the similarity of the 
tests. The Seventh Circuit introduced a different disparate impact test in Ar­
lington Heights, 12 9  one of the first disparate impact cases under the FHA.1 30 
The circuit has since adopted the test described above, explaining that "[t]he 
analysis [in Arlington Heights] was in fact though not in words the 'dispa­
rate impact' analysis familiar from Title VII cases."13 1  The other courts 
applying the Arlington Heights test have not had the opportunity to revisit 
their rulings in light of the Seventh Circuit's subsequent analysis.1 32 
1 26. See Fair Hous. in Huntington Comm. v. Town of Huntington, 3 1 6  F.3d 357, 366 (2d Cir. 
2003); Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49-50 ( 1st Cir. 2000); Harris v. Itzhaki, 1 83 
F.3d 1043, 105 1 (9th Cir. 1 999) (explaining that "[w]e apply Title VII discrimination analysis in 
examining Fair Housing Act discrimination claims," although the decision was ultimately based on a 
finding of discriminatory intent) (quoting Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 304 (9th Cir. 
1997))); Mountain Side Mobile Estates P'ship v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 56 F.3d 1243, 1 250--
51 (I 0th Cir. 1995); Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 1 48-49; United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1 1 79, 
1 184-85 (8th Cir. 1974); Owens v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 3:03-CV- 1 1 84-H, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 1 5701 ,  at *49-50 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2005). The Eighth Circuit did not mention the policy 
and causation elements, requiring only that "the conduct of the defendant actually or predictably 
results in racial discrimination." However, that case considered a zoning ordinance, so the policy 
and causation elements were clear. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1 1 84. 
1 27. Stanton, supra note 1 25,  at 1 86. 
1 28. Other circuits, although recognizing disparate impact under the FHA, have not had occa­
sion to formulate precise tests, see Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546, 1555 (5th Cir. 
1996); Jackson v. Okaloosa County, 2 1  F.3d 1531 ,  1 543 ( ! I th Cir. 1994); Hanson v. Veterans 
Admin., 800 F.2d 1 3 8 1 ,  1 389 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding inadequate proof of causation and not discuss­
ing the burden-shifting portion of the test), although a lower court in the Fifth Circuit has adopted 
the Title VII test, Owens, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1 5701 ,  at *49-50. 
1 29. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Viii. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1 283, 1 290 (7th Cir. 
1977). 
1 30. The Seventh Circuit found four factors to be relevant in determining whether disparate 
impact was present: 
( 1)  how strong is the plaintiff's showing of discriminatory effect; (2) is there some evidence of 
discriminatory intent, though not enough to satisfy the constitutional standard of Washington 
v. Davis; (3) what is the defendant's interest in taking the action complained of; and (4) does 
the plaintiff seek to compel the defendant to affirmatively provide housing for members of mi­
nority groups or merely to restrain the defendant from interfering with individual property 
owners who wish to provide such housing. 
Id. Finding only the first and fourth factors present, the court called it a "close case" and decided in 
favor of the plaintiffs. Id. at 1 290--93. 
1 3 1 .  Viii. of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 152 1 ,  1533 (7th Cir. 1990). 
1 32. See Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982); Arthur v. City of 
Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 1 986) (adopting three of the four factors but declining to con­
sider intent). 
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B. Application of the FHA Disparate Impact 
Standard to Insurance 
2009 
The language and history of the FHA support the application of its dis­
parate impact test to claims of discrimination in insurance. The "because of 
race" clause in § 3604 applies equally to the sale or rental of a home and to 
other actions, such as insurance policies, that "make unavailable or deny" a 
home. 133 Similarly, § 3605 makes discrimination "because of race" illegal in 
"transactions" and defines that term to include lending and "providing other 
financial assistance." 13 4 Courts have held that the disparate impact standard 
applies to the other activities covered under§ 3604 and§ 3605. 135 Given the 
integrality of insurance and housing 13 6 and the broad goals of the FHA, 137 it 
makes little sense to carve out an exception to the disparate impact standard 
for insurance. 
Judicial decisions support the conclusion that the FHA applies to insur­
ance policies with disparate impacts. Although no circuit court has 
considered a disparate impact challenge to insurance policy under the 
FHA, 138 the broad language used to describe the applicability of the dispa­
rate impact standard does not suggest a distinction between insurance and 
other practices. 139 When considering other suits under the FHA, courts have 
agreed that "[e]ffect, and not motivation, is the touchstone [under the FHA] 
. . .  because . . .  'the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as disastrous 
and unfair to private rights and the public interest as the perversity of a will­
ful scheme.' " 140 Moreover, the three district courts that have considered 
disparate impact challenges to insurance practices have seen no reason to 
exempt insurance from the disparate impact test.141 
1 33. 42 u.s.c. § 3604 (2000). 
1 34. Id. § 3605. 
1 35. See, e.g., Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1 546, 1555 (5th Cir. 1 995) (loans); 
United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1 179, 1 1 84 (8th Cir. 1974) (rental). 
1 36. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
1 37. See supra notes 59-72 and accompanying text. 
1 38. The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have both avoided ruling on disparate impact insurance 
discrimination cases. Dehoyos v. Allstate Corp., 345 F.3d 290 (5th Cir. 2003) (addressing only the 
McCarran-Ferguson preemption issue on interlocutory appeal prior to the settlement of the case); 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1 35 1 ,  1 363 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding that, in the ab­
sence of a specific HUD regulation on the applicability of the disparate impact test to insurance, the 
question was not ripe for review, but finding against the insurance companies on disparate treatment 
grounds). 
1 39. See, e.g., Simms, 83 F.3d at 1555 (holding that a "violation of the FHA may be estab­
lished . . .  by a showing of significant discriminatory effect" without any language limiting the 
holding to certain types of violations). 
140. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1 185 (quoting Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 , 497 
(D.D.C. 1 967)). 
1 4 1 .  Owens v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 3:03-CV- 1 1 84-H, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
1 570 1 ,  at *49-50 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2005); Nat'I Fair Hous. Alliance, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of 
Am., 208 F. Supp. 2d 46, 49 (D.D.C. 2002); Toledo Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 94 
Ohio Misc. 2d 1 5 1  (Ohio C.P. 1997). 
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Insurance companies maintain that the process of adverse selection in 
the insurance industry raises unique concerns, making a disparate impact 
test inappropriate for insurance. 142 Insurance is priced based on the average 
risk of loss in the pool of insureds.143 Insurers argue that insurance pricing is 
most effective when insureds can be pooled into groups whose members 
share "similar characteristics."144 If risk levels were not similar among mem­
bers of a pool, those whose risk levels were less than average for the pool 
would drop out rather than subsidize higher-risk members. This would in­
crease the price of insurance for the remaining insured and decrease the 
profit for the insurance company. If left unchecked, this adverse selection 
would result in a "death spiral," in which only the highest-risk individuals 
would be willing to buy insurance, and the insurance market would "im­
plode."145 Insurers argue that minority neighborhoods, particularly those in 
the inner city, are especially risky to insure because of high crime rates, poor 
services, and aging dwellings.146 If these factors were not taken into account, 
people in lower-risk neighborhoods would have to pay increased premiums 
to subsidize the costs of insuring high-risk, minority neighborhoods. This 
would result in raising prices beyond expected losses in low-risk neighbor­
hoods, causing everyone who does not live in a high-risk minority 
neighborhood to drop their insurance coverage.147 
The Fourth Circuit agreed with the insurance companies that, due to 
these special policy concerns, insurance cannot be lumped in with "other 
services" within the meaning of the FHA.148 The court found that, due to the 
special problem of adverse selection in insurance, the FHA does not apply 
even where insurers expressly consider race in underwriting decisions.149 
Because of the special considerations in the insurance business, the court 
argued, Congress would not have made discrimination in homeowners in­
surance unlawful without special discussion.150 The Seventh Circuit, while 
applying the FHA to insurance disparate treatment, also suggested that the 
142. Although insurers make similar arguments against the application of the FHA to dis­
criminatory treatment, the Mackey court is the only court ever to find the argument compelling in 
the discriminatory treatment context. Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 419  (4th Cir. 1984). 
143. Detlefsen, supra note 20, at 4. 
144. NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 290 (7th Cir. 1992). 
145. Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 1 13 
YALE L.J. 1 223, 1254 (2004). 
146. Detlefsen, supra note 20, at 9. 
147. Id. at 5. 
148. Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 4 19, 423 (4th Cir. 1 984). 
149. Id. 
1 50. Id. This argument should fail when applied to direct racial discrimination. The insurance 
industry does not require insurers to "engage in disparate treatment, to draw lines on the basis of 
race rather than risk." NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 298 (7th Cir. 1 992). As 
Judge Easterbrook observed, "[r]isk discrimination is not race discrimination." Id. at 290. Prejudice 
would undermine, not improve, the accuracy of insurance pricing. To the extent that the success of 
the insurance business relies on accurate risk assessment, refusal to follow the FHA's ban on dispa­
rate treatment would harm the insurance industry. 
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nature of the insurance industry makes disparate impact analysis inappropri­
ate.151 
Empirical evidence undermines this argument. Low-risk individuals do 
not reduce their coverage when placed in insurance pools with higher-risk . d 152 Th' . b fi 1 1 1 . . k 153 msure s. IS IS ecause, rst, peop e are very poor at ca cu atmg ns . 
The particularly high information and search costs relating to insurance ex­
acerbate the impact of this weakness on insurance decisions.154 As a result, 
low-risk individuals, who could logically remove themselves from the in­
surance pool, will not recognize that they are paying more than their 
optimum rate.155 Second, the risk-averse are typically both more likely to 
buy insurance and less expensive to insure than others.156 This is because, in 
addition to purchasing insurance, these "belt-and-suspenders types" will 
take further steps to reduce their own risk.157 Since customers who are inex­
pensive to insure will not abandon the insurance market, insurers may not 
need special treatment under the FHA. 
Moreover, even if insurance companies do need to be able to differentiate 
among risk categories to some extent, they need not be exempt from disparate 
impact liability. If the insurance industry actually requires the use of a particu­
lar indicator in order to operate profitably, it will prevail under the business 
necessity test. 158 In a recent case, one district court applied a disparate impact 
test to insurance, dismissing the argument that insurance companies should 
not be held liable for disparate impact as "unavailing in light of the availabil­
ity of the 'business justification' defense."159 In a similar case decided under 
Ohio state law, a court found that "the disparate-impact approach does not 
unduly undermine the business of selling insurance. Assuming . . . that the 
1 5 1 .  Am. Family , 978 F.2d at 290. 
1 52. Siegelman, supra note 145, at 1 248. 
153. Id. at 1 241-46 (surveying studies that demonstrate human inability to calculate their own 
risk of loss). 
154. Squires, supra note 2 1 ,  at 76. 
1 55. Id. 
1 56. Siegelman, supra note 145, at 1 270-74 (surveying studies that demonstrate propitious 
selection, rather than adverse selection, in insurance). For example, people who buy life insurance 
live longer than those who do not, even after controlling for factors such as income and smoking 
status. Id. at 1 270. 
1 57. Id. at 1 266; see also Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry, P rivate Information and Its 
Effect on Market Equilibrium: New Evidence from Long-Term Care Insurance 3, 30 (Nat'! Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9957, 2003), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/ 
w9957.pdf (finding that more cautious individuals are more likely to have long-term care insurance 
and less likely to enter a nursing home because they are more likely to seek preventative care). 
1 58. Cf Thomas v. First Fed. Sav. Bank, 653 F. Supp. 1 330, 1 341  (N.D. Ind. 1987) (approv­
ing use of a loan-to-value ratio in underwriting decisions as a legitimate business criterion, even 
though it makes loans unavailable on low-value, inner-city homes). 
159. Nat'! Fair Hous. Alliance, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 208 F. Supp. 2d 46, 60 
(D.D.C. 2002). 
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insurance industry is based on 'fair' risk discrimination, the disparate­
impact approach will not impede such fair discrimination."160 
The fact that circuit courts have held other financial services providers 
liable for disparate impacts further supports this conclusion.161 Lenders are 
similar to insurers in that both are concerned about the risk associated with 
their investment and look for accurate indicators of that risk. Although some 
have argued that the insurance industry must be free to discriminate based 
on risk, 162 this is no less true for the credit industry. Therefore, since lenders 
are liable for disparate impacts, there is no reason to exempt insurers. 163 
C. Burden of Proof in the Disparate Impact 
Test for Insurance under the FHA 
Courts disagree about who bears the burden of showing the absence of a 
discriminatory alternative, the final step of the disparate impact test. Some 
borrow from Title VII and hold that once the defendant has shown a busi­
ness necessity, the burden should shift back to the plaintiff to rebut the 
defendant's evidence by showing that a less discriminatory alternative ex­
ists. 164 Others require that the defendant show the lack of a less 
discriminatory alternative as part of the showing of business necessity.165 
These courts argue that the Title VII test is inappropriate in the Title VIII 
context.166 Title VII's burden shifting is justified only by the need for em­
ployers to pick the best person for job, a concern not relevant when selecting 
a tenant.167 
160. Toledo Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 94 Ohio Misc. 2d 1 5 1 ,  1 57 (Ohio 
C.P. 1 997). 
1 6 1 .  See, e.g., Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 8 3  F.3d 1546, 1555 (5th Cir. 1995). 
162. See, e.g. , P rudential Ins., 208 F. Supp. 2d at 60. 
163. This is particularly true in today's economy, since many companies provide both loans 
and insurance to their customers. Many insurers even have mortgage lenders as subsidiaries. Wil­
liam C. Apgar & Mark Duda, The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Community Reinvestment Act: 
Past Accomplishments and Future Regulatory Challenges, 9 FED. RES. BANK N.Y. EcoN. Pot.. R. 
169, 1 83 (2003). However, the application of disparate impact to credit continues to be controversial 
because it is believed to interfere with the assessment of credit risk. See generally Mahoney, supra 
note 1 23. 
164. See Oti Kaga, Inc. v. S.D. Hous. Dev. Auth., 342 F.3d 87 1 ,  883-84 (8th Cir. 2003); 
Mountain Side Mobile Estates P'ship v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 56 F.3d 1 243, 1254 (10th Cir. 
1995) (applying the Title VII standard without discussion of possible differences in the Title VIlI 
context). 
165. See Fair Hous. in Huntington Comm. v. Town of Huntington, 3 1 6  F.3d 357, 366 (2d Cir. 
2003); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 1 26, 148-49 (3d Cir. 1977). 
166. See, e.g .. Riv.a, 564 F.2d at 148-49 (differentiating Title VIl cases and placing the bur­
den of proving that no less discriminatory alternative exists on the defendant in FHA cases because 
the qualities that employers may legitimately consider are more easily defined than those in the 
housing context, and because "the consequences of an error in admitting a tenant do not seem nearly 
as severe as, for example, the consequences of an error in hiring an unqualified airline pilot" (quot­
ing Elliot M. Mincberg, Comment, Applying the Title VII P rima Facie Case to Title Vlll Litigation, 
1 1  HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 28, 174 (1976))). 
167. Id. 
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It is appropriate to place the burden on the insurer-defendant in Title 
VIII insurance discrimination cases.168 Not only does the Title VII justifica­
tion not apply, but placing the burden on the defendant is justified in this 
context because only the insurer has access to data on the details of, and 
justifications for, its pricing models.169 Moreover, insurance companies rou­
tinely destroy data on rejected claims, making it particularly onerous for 
plaintiffs to prove discrimination.110 Since the defendant has sole access to 
the evidence, the defendant should also bear the burden of proof.171 
Notwithstanding the protection afforded insurers by the business neces­
sity test, insurance companies argue that placing the burden of proof on the 
insurance company effectively makes the business necessity defense un­
available. Insurance companies claim that requiring them to maintain 
information justifying the business necessity of each factor used in under­
writing would be f rohibitively expensive and damaging to the entire 
insurance industry.17 Although the data may not be easy for insurers to 
gather, they have much more ready access to this information than do their 
customers.173 If accurate classification of risk is as important to the insurance 
business as insurers claim, it seems unlikely that insurers would rely on risk­
assessment factors without knowing how these factors actually correlate to 
risk. If, in fact, insurers are not maintaining this information, the business 
necessity requirement may aid them in improving their pricing models.174 
III. APPLICATION OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT TEST 
TO SPECIFIC INSURANCE POLICIES 
Many insurance pricing mechanisms disproportionately impact minori­
ties. This Part applies the disparate impact test to insurers' use of age and 
value requirements, territory rating, and subjective factors such as good 
housekeeping and pride of ownership. Section III.A concludes that use of 
these policies establishes a prima facie disparate impact case. Section III.B 
considers the applicability of the business necessity defense in this context. 
168. See, e.g., Stanton, supra note 1 25, at 1 84 (arguing that defendants are due less deference 
in Title VIII cases than in Title VII cases because there is less need for the defendant to make fine 
distinctions between applicants; employers may be harmed by not hiring the best person for the job, 
but these considerations do not apply in the housing context). 
169. William E. Murray, Homeowners Insurance Redlining: the Inadequacy of Federal Reme­
dies and the Future of the Property Insurance War, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 735, 744-45 (1997-98). 
170. Id. 
1 7 1 .  This i s  comparable to the justification of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Cf Byrne v. 
Boadle, 1 59 Eng. Rep. 299, 301 (Exch. Div. 1863) (placing the burden of proof on the defendant 
because "how could [the plaintiff] possibly ascertain from what cause it occurred?"). 
172. Detlefsen, supra note 20, at 38-39. 
173. See supra notes 169-170 and accompanying text. 
174. Cf Squires, supra note 21, at 76 (arguing that "[r]esearch on the causes of urban prop­
erty losses . . .  could further help insurers to improve the efficiency and fairness of their pricing 
systems and underwriting criteria."). 
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A. Elements of a Prima Facie Case of Disparate Impact 
Establishing the first two elements of a prima facie case (the existence 
of specific policies and racial differences) is straightforward. Insurance 
companies have specific policies on the above-mentioned factors. A recent 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) report demon­
strates the existence of a disparate impact with its finding that low-income, 
urban, minority homeowners are charged more for insurance and have fewer 
options than others.175 Therefore, this Section concentrates on the third ele­
ment: causation. 
Proving that the maximum-age and minimum-value requirements cause 
a disparate impact should not be difficult, given the correlation between race 
and class. Researchers have found that minorities are more likely than 
whites to live in old homes.176 This is not surprising, as a higher percentage 
of blacks than whites live in poverty.177 It is common sense that poor people 
are more likely than others to buy inexpensive homes. In most areas, these 
inexpensive homes are likely to be old.178 Furthermore, since white-flight 
remains common,'79 even middle-class blacks tend to live in less expensive 
homes than whites with equivalent incomes.180 Nationally, homes belonging 
to black homeowners are worth 1 8% less, on average, than homes owned by 
white homeowners with the same incomes. 181 Some insurance companies 
have already eliminated maximum-age and minimum-value requirements, in 
recognition of their vulnerability to suit. 182 
Territorial rating practices should also be found to have a disparate im­
pact. 183 The specific factors considered by insurance companies, such as the 
number of owner-occupied homes in an area, the number of vacant build­
ings in an area, the crime rate, and the quality of municipal services, all vary 
1 75.  Otis, Urban Gap, supra note 28, at 3 .  
1 76. Squires, supra note 2 1 ,  at 1 1 . 
1 77. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PuBL'N No. P60-226, INCOME, 
POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2003, at 9 (2004), available 
at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p60-226.pdf (finding that the poverty rate among blacks 
was 24.4 percent in 2003, compared with 8.2 percent among whites). 
1 78. MEYER, supra note 101 ,  at 8. As urban areas grow, upper- and middle-income residents 
typically move into new homes on the urban periphery. ANTHONY DOWNS, NEIGHBORHOODS AND 
URBAN DEVELOPMENT 38-39 (1981). The value of older homes left behind in the center is de­
pressed by the availability of new homes on the periphery, and these homes are occupied by poor 
households. Id. 
179. MEYER, supra note 101 , at 2 1 8-!9. 
1 80. Brookings, Housing Policy, supra note 6, at 58. 
1 8 1 .  Id. For every dollar of income, white owners had $2.64 worth of house. Black owners 
had $2. 16  worth of house. Id. 
1 82. L.H. Otis, Top Carriers Make Moves in Urban Market, 100 NAT'L UNDERWRITER: PROP. 
& CASUALTY/RISK & BENEFITS MGMT. ED. I ( 1996). The use of maximum age has been replaced 
with other indicators such as the condition of roof and the age of wiring, furnace, and plumbing. 
Barbara Bowers, Redeveloping the Urban Market, 99 BEST'S REv. 1 1 , 32 (1 999); see also Stanton, 
supra note 1 25, at 176 (discussing the use of lead paint as a proxy for age of home). 
1 83. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text (discussing specific territorial rating 
policies). 
August 2006] The Fair Housing Act 2015 
between inner ci ty and suburban areas.184 These factors have a di sp arate i m­
p act because resi denti al segregation is sti ll common, 18 5 and minority 
homeowners are more li kely than whi tes to own homes in i nner- city areas.18 6 
P erhap s because i nsurers recogniz e the vulnerabi li ty of these fa ctors to 
di sp arate i mp act challenges, they have begun to rate terri tori es based solely 
on the amount that the i nsurer has p ai d  out in clai ms from that area. 1 8 7 To 
establi sh that thi s typ e of terri tori al rati ng has a disp arate i mp act, i t  i s  neces­
sary to access the territori al rati ngs used by i nsurance comp ani es. 
U nfo rtunately, li mited data are avai lable on thi s  p oint because i nsurance 
p ri cing models have been p rotected as trade secrets.188 If minority areas re­
ceive more expensi ve territori al ratings than whi te areas, such ratings would 
have a disp arate i mp act. 
The use of subj ective factors in determini ng ri sk may support raci al di s­
criminati on because i t  allows i nsurance agents to act out thei r own bi ases. 
Although no comp rehensive research has been done, there have been i ndi ca­
ti ons that agent bi as has some effect. For i nstance, one study of homeowners 
insurance p ayments, followin g a hurri cane in Flori da, suggested that lan­
guage and cultural barri ers make assessors less likely to trust L ati no 
insureds.1 8 9  Insurers are also more li kely to requi re comp rehensive i nsp ec­
tion of homes in non- white nei ghborhoods.190 Agent bias has also been 
i ndi cated by i nsurers' reluctance to market i nsurance in urban areas, even 
where they stand to p rofit. For examp le, in Missouri ,  the average commi s­
sion per agent i s  $25,891 in areas with the hi ghest mi nority p op ulati on, 
comp ared to $3,08 1 i n  the areas with smallest minority p op ulati on.1 91 Insurer 
1 84. For example, in 2004, 53. l % of people in central cities owned their homes, compared to 
75.7% of suburban residents. U.S. Census Bureau, Housing Vacancies and Homeownership, 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/annual04/ann04t12.html (last visited May 17, 2006). 
Crime rates in inner-city areas typically exceed those in suburban areas. In 2003, for example, an 
urban home was half again as likely as a suburban home to be burglarized, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, Victimization Rates by Type of Crime and Locality of Residence, http:// 
www.ojp.usdoj .gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cvus/current/cv0353.pdf (last visited May 17, 2006), and black, 
urban heads of household were twice as likely as white, suburban heads of household to be victims 
of burglary. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Victimization Rates By Locality of Residence, Race of 
Head of Household and Type of Crime, http:!/www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cvus/current/ 
cv0355.pdf (last visited May 17,  2006). 
1 85. See MEYER, supra note 1 0 1 ,  at 1 1 . 
1 86. Brookings, Housing Policy, supra note 6, at 56. 
1 87. Supra note 22. 
1 88. The California Supreme Court recently ordered State Farm to release the number of 
policies issued and canceled by zip code. In doing so, the court rejected the argument that these data 
should be protected as trade secrets, on grounds that the intent of Proposition 1 03 was to override 
trade secret claims. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Garamendi, 32 Cal. 4th 1029, 1 046-47 (2004). 
This decision suggests the potential for providing access to additional information. 
1 89. Tom Baker & Karen McElrath, Whose Safety Net?: Home Insurance and Inequity, 2 1  
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 229, 254 ( 1996). This study also found indications that insurance companies 
pay men more in damages than they pay women. Id. at 253. 
190. Murray, supra note 1 69, at 737. 
191 .  Squires, supra note 2 1 ,  a t  88. 
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bias could explain the unwillingness of agents to move into urban areas until 
this differential is equalized.192 
Since 1996, a few lower courts have recognized that the above­
mentioned policies cause sufficient disparate impact to support a prima facie 
case under the FHA. The D.C. District Court denied the defendant's sum­
mary judgment motion in a case challenging the use of ( 1) age, market 
value, and the difference between market value and replacement cost, 
(2) territorial rating zones that "reflect" racial composition, and (3) the use 
of credit ratings.193 In a similar case, an Ohio state court found sufficient 
evidence that using these factors is discriminatory to deny the insurer's mo­
tion for summary judgment.194 Both cases subsequently settled, with the 
insurance company agreeing to discontinue use of these factors and to in­
crease marketing in urban areas.195 These outcomes provide further evidence 
of the causal link between these insurance practices and the disparate impact 
on minorities. 
B. The Business Necessity Defense 
The above-mentioned insurance policies are legal, in spite of their dispa­
rate impact, if justified by business necessity.196 The burden rests on the 
insurer to show that the metrics used to measure risk are predictive of loss. 
The insurer should also bear the burden of showing that the metrics used are 
better predictors of loss than other available metrics.197 For example, an in­
surer using the age of the home in underwriting and pricing decisions would 
have to provide data showing both that the age of a home is an accurate pre­
dictor of risk and that more specific indicators, such as the age of the wiring 
and plumbing, would not be more accurate. 
The limited data available suggest that the use of factors that result in 
higher insurance rates for high minority areas may exceed what may be 
justified by business necessity.198 An analysis of data available in 
1 92. Id. at 74. 
193. Nat'! Fair Hous. Alliance Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 208 F. Supp. 2d 46, 49 
(D.D.C. 2002). The court accepted, for the purposes of the 12(b )(6) motion, the plaintiffs' allegation 
that these policies were "not justified or supported by business necessity . . .  and [that] less restric­
tive, non-discriminatory alternatives [were] available to meet any legitimate business objectives." Id. 
at 50. 
194. Toledo Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 94 Ohio Misc. 2d 1 5 1  (Ohio C.P. 
1 997) (considering a disparate impact insurance claim under provisions of the Ohio Civil Rights Act 
similar to HUD regulation 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(d)(4) (2005)). 
195. Toledo Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 94 Ohio Misc. 2d 1 86, 195-203 
(Ohio C.P. 1 998). 
196. See supra note 1 25 and accompanying text. 
1 97. See supra Section II.C. 
1 98. NAIC and the Missouri Department of Insurance have made public limited information 
which suggests insurance companies pay out the most per dwelling in neighborhoods where more 
than half of the residents are minorities. Interestingly, the data also show that loss costs are lowest in 
integrated neighborhoods (with minority populations of four to fifty percent). Squires, supra note 
21 ,  at 58. 
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M issouri199 show s that, although homeow ners in minority areas pay higher 
insurance r ates than others,200 the ratio of losses paid by the insur ance com­
pany to premiums paid by the insured is actually low er in high-mi nority 
areas (.73 compared to . 8 1). This indicates that residents of minor ity areas 
are overcharged fo r their insurance. 2 01 The one national study on point, a 
1 994 study of insurance data by rating territory done by N AIC, suggests that 
these differences are not unique to M issouri. The study concluded that 
"residents of low -income and minority neighborhoods face greater diffi culty 
in obtaining high-quality homeow ners insurance coverage" and pay more 
fo r that coverage.2 0 2  The NAIC report determined that the insur ance industry 
had not provided loss-cost data to j ustify these differences. 2 0 3  
I n  all metropolitan areas fo r w hich data are available, the average insur­
ance pr emi um is substanti ally higher in neighborhoods w here more than 
half of the residents are mi norities than it is in neighborhoods w here few er 
than thr ee per cent of the residents are minorities.204 This is true even w hen 
controlling for neighborhood income leveI .2°5 In high-income w hite areas, 
premiums aver age 53% of those paid _in high-income, high-minority areas.206 
Similarly, residents of low -income w hite areas pay only 54% of the premi­
ums paid by residents of low- income, minority areas. 2 0 7  The difference is 
slightly less stark in medium-income ar eas, w here residents of w hite 
neighborhoods pay 72% as much as residents in high- minority areas. 2 0 8  The 
claim that these differ ences in pricing are needed to cover higher costs has 
not been substantiated by the M issouri data and the N AIC r eport. 
CONCLUSION 
W hen insurance policies function to make insurance more expensive in 
urban areas w ith large minority populations, the impacts are felt not only by 
the individual homeow ners, but by broader society as w ell. Lack of insur­
ance provides further j ustification fo r w hite flight, because lack of insurance 
199. Missouri is the only state that has maintained comprehensive data on losses and premi­
ums by zip code over a long period. Id. at 53. Unfortunately, national data are not currently 
available. 
200. Homeowners in high minority areas pay higher insurance rates than others, averaging 
$5.06 per thousand dollars of insurance, compared to $4.37 in areas where fewer than three percent 
of the residents are minorities. Id. at 59. 
201 .  Id. The difference is even greater for limited coverage insurance plans. Id. 
202. Otis, Urban Gap, supra note 28, at 3. 
203. Id. 
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in minority areas will make houses unmarketable.209 It hastens the deteriora­
tion of slums because landlords cannot invest in their properties, nor can 
purchasers buy empty buildings, without insurance. As The President's Na­
tional Advisory Panel explained 38 years ago: 
Insurance is essential to revitalize our cities. It is a cornerstone of credit. 
Without insurance, banks and other financial institutions will not-and 
cannot-make loans. New housing cannot be constructed, and existing 
housing cannot be repaired. New businesses cannot be opened, and exist­
ing businesses expand, or even survive. 
Without insurance, buildings are left to deteriorate; services, goods, and 
jobs diminish. Efforts to rebuild our nation's inner cities cannot move for­
ward. Communities without insurance are communities without hope.210 
209. The "(d]iscriminatory denial of access to 'normal' insurance and relegation of minorities 
to state FAIR plans creates 'the racially segregated housing patterns' which the Fair Housing Act is 
designed to prevent." Dunn v. Midwestern Indem. Mid-Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 472 F. Supp. 1 106, 
1 1 1 1-12 (S.D. Ohio 1979). 
210. ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 16, at I. 
